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Keats, Truth, and Empathy 
 
Peter Shum 
 
 
At one level, Keats’s sonnet entitled On Peace (1814) is full of philosophical certainties. 
The speaker believes, for example, that a nation’s people have a right to live in freedom 
under the rule of law, and that the rule of law should be applicable to everybody. 
Political and philosophical commitments of this kind do not seem to be called into 
question in this poem, or made the subject of an enquiry. On the contrary, it is as 
though we are confronted with somebody who, in certain central thematic respects at 
least, appears to know his own mind. 
 At a different but no less important level, however, this is surely a poem which is 
pervaded by uncertainty. The startled opening “Oh Peace!” is juxtaposed with 
interrogative doubt.1 Some kind of glimmer of “peace” may have flickered in the war 
against Napoleon, but its significance and signification within the terms of the poem 
remain manifestly open to question. (The year, after all, is still only 1814.) The speaker 
may be experiencing joy, but he still yearns for it to be “complete[d]”.2 Just how this 
incipient “peace” is to unfold remains a question whose answer is conspicuously 
deferred, with the poem’s historical consciousness in the closing line straining 
somehow to bridge a void between “horrors past” and a highly indeterminate “happier 
fate”.3 The poem thus ends by invoking the kind of liminality of thought – between 
presence and absence, between the “now” and the “not yet” – that so often seems to 
constitute the result (I do not say conclusion) of Keats’s poetical ruminations. 
 We find, then, that while part of what this poem discloses can be adequately 
paraphrased (e.g. certain moral and philosophical stances), part of it cannot. The poem 
conveys not only the intellectual content of a certain state of mind, but something 
about that state of mind itself as a lived experience. If we are entitled to assume that 
certain aspects of experience are common to all human subjects (I want to concur with 
Edmund Husserl’s view that we are), then we are entitled, too, at least to broach the 
possibility that a poem could disclose important aspects of experience in general. This 
in turn must lead us to take seriously the possibility that poetry, and perhaps literature 
more generally, could be pertinent in substantive respects to the field of 
phenomenology. 
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 A number of interconnected philosophical and literary theoretical lines of enquiry 
seem to be presenting themselves. Firstly, if we are interested in literary disclosure and 
revelation, then there is the question of what kinds of content can be disclosed. I want 
to focus on the possibilities that literary disclosure could be affective, could be 
phenomenological, and could be moral. But we also need to think about how these 
different kinds of content might be inter-related, and whether there is something about 
literature which might make it especially conducive to affective, phenomenological, 
and moral disclosure.  
 Secondly, there are questions about the modality of disclosure in a literary context. 
Deductive reasoning is a perfectly good example of a modality of disclosure, but it is 
not one which is characteristic of literary experience, which is not to say that literature 
has no role to play in wider processes of rational enquiry, but that is a separate matter. 
Very often, however, it does seem to be appropriate to say of literary experience that it 
is as though one is encountering the particularity and uniqueness of another mind. 
Indeed, it is difficult to think of a work of literature for which this is not the case. In 
reading Keats’s On Peace, it is as though one is encountering another mind expressing 
complex emotion in a unique and personal way. Intuitively, then, it seems right to say 
that there must be some kind of connection between intersubjectivity and the 
modalities of literary disclosure. Yet it is much harder to explicate just how a literary 
text could take us to another mind. Is the speaker in On Peace a construct of the 
imagination, or a construct of the text? I want to suggest that this is a question which is 
proper to the discipline of phenomenology. I have already suggested that the content of 
literary disclosure could be phenomenological. I now add the observation that 
phenomenology is unmistakably, and arguably by definition, the most appropriate 
means by which to explore the modalities of literary disclosure. 
 Thirdly, questions about the modality of literary disclosure seem to lead on to 
questions about indeterminacy of meaning. Earlier, I noted that aspects of the meaning 
of Keats’s On Peace seem to be indeterminate. The opening exclamation “Oh Peace!” 
could express desire or surprise, or both. It seems to some extent to be up to the reader 
to surmise the degree of each emotion that is involved. The poem ends by looking 
forward to an unspecified “happier fate”, but do we not value this closing line’s 
indeterminacy precisely because there is something essentially indeterminate about 
yearning? We are also entitled to ask whether literary interpretation in general has an 
ineluctable moment of indeterminacy. Is there always a gap between poetical self-
expression and self-disclosure? What is the phenomenological relation between the 
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experiences that we comprehend in artistic expression and the artistic phenomena 
themselves? Seeking answers to these questions is a way of entering the long acclivity 
toward a clarification of the relevance of intersubjectivity to indeterminacy in art, and 
the relevance of such indeterminacy to aesthetic value. 
 We must remember that an attempt to theorise in a sustained fashion about the 
nature of literature will almost inevitably bring some meta-theoretical questions in 
tow, and not undesirably so. For academic scholars of literature, the impulse to theorise 
about literature is often strong, and in many respects appropriate. Sometimes it is 
desirable within academic discourse to seek to make claims about art in general, or 
about literature in general. One such claim, for instance, is that it can be fruitful and 
illuminating to construe the encounter with a literary work in intersubjective terms, 
and this is a claim that I want to broadly sustain. Let me point out that I am trying 
neither to legislate for how students and scholars of literature should go about their 
studies, nor ultimately to adopt an essentialist stance, either toward the processes 
involved in literary criticism, or towards some mistakenly transcendent idea of 
“literature”. It does not, in my view, ultimately make sense to treat “literature” as a 
static concept curiously abstracted from the passage of history, or to expect it to 
function adequately as such, within either literary theoretical or philosophical 
discourse. We might say that the synchronic state of literary art in its dialectical 
relation to prevailing culture is subverted at all times by a refusal of self-identity, by an 
immanent tendency toward diachronic mutability, toward the subversion of culture, 
the overturning by literature of what literature itself once was; that, as Paul de Man 
suggests, there is “something about literature, as such, which allows for a discrepancy 
between [literary] truth and [critical] method”;4  that there is something about 
literature which makes it curiously resistant to theory; that literature is continually in a 
process of transforming itself; that bold claims about the nature of literature 
sometimes seem to invite or provoke the surfacing of counter-examples; and that, 
consequently, literary “theory”, in spite of its name, cannot in the final analysis 
properly regard itself as theoretical through and through, but instead as being 
contaminated by what de Man calls a “necessarily pragmatic moment that certainly 
weakens it as theory”.5  
 Yet, as de Man also suggests, literature’s resistance to theory is really only one side 
of what can more properly be regarded as a kind of literature-theory dialectic or 
double-bind. For experienced literary scholars, a contemplative shift toward the 
controlled reflection upon the formation of critical method is arguably inevitable, and 
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certainly justifiable in virtue of a commonality and recurrence in the modalities of the 
production and reception of meaning and value across multiple literary works, or even 
large subsets of the canon. We might say that great literary works are always unique but 
never wholly sui generis, in the sense that their greatness is connected with their 
embeddedness within, and relation to, a tradition that precedes them, and usually with 
a contemporary milieu of co-influencing works. For this reason, the apprehension of 
patterns (I do not say laws) in the way that literary works often seem to operate is an 
important part of literary scholarship which can inform the development of a meta-
critical and meta-rhetorical discussion engaging with such questions as the cognition 
of moral values in a literary context. I am not going to foreground the theory/anti-
theory colluctation in this essay, but I don’t deny its importance. It may even be 
constitutive of the study of literature itself. The main way in which it will manifest 
itself in what follows will be that I shall make every effort to refrain from purporting to 
make claims about “the essential nature of literature”, and from assuming that the 
term “literature” refers in the end to something historically stable and self-identical. 
 John Keats certainly revelled in poetry’s capacity to surprise those of a theoretical 
disposition, as his oft-quoted remark that “What shocks the virtuous philosopher 
delights the chameleon poet”6 seems to suggest. In this sense, it would seem that 
Keats’s “chameleon poet” can not only disrupt the conceptual frames of systematic 
philosophers, but surprise theorists of literature too in ways that can never be fully 
predicted. Nonetheless, Keats’s understanding of this putative poetry-philosophy 
polarity did not prevent him from thinking abstractly about poetry. Indeed, some of the 
concerns of this essay stem from the observation that Keats, a poet whose genius is as 
undisputed as his canonical place in the history of English literature, also bequeaths to 
us, in the text of his posthumously collated letters, a sophisticated body of meta-
poetical writing, and a complex implicit theoretical understanding of his chosen art. I 
want enquire into the extent to which a coherent theoretical understanding of poetry 
may be extracted from Keats’s meta-poetical thought. I propose to examine the text of 
Keats’s letters in order to assess his account of the nature of poetry and its relation to 
truth, as well as his explanatory account of how poetry and poetical effects are 
produced. 
I want to begin by noting that Keats has a particular conception of “sensations” 
which goes beyond any usual meaning of the term, and this notion is elaborated in his 
letters in some detail. In a poetical context, the “sensations” in which Keats’s interest 
lies are also referred to as “passions”,7 and Keats takes the “passions” to encompass not 
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only the emotions (as the term is normally understood) but, perhaps most importantly, 
to include a faculty that Keats calls the “imagination”. We must ask why this 
“imagination” should be construed as a “passion”. The reason implicit in Keats’s letters 
is clear: the imagination is both creative and intense. For example - a century before 
Proust did the same - Keats reflects upon the intensely evocative and synaesthetic 
powers capable of being invoked by a sensory fragment. (Keats’s chosen example, an 
auditory precursor of Proust’s Madeleine cake, is an old melody.)8 It is via this notion of 
spontaneous intensity that Keats finds a conception of beauty. Intense passions are 
held to be “sublime”, and it is precisely in this sublimity that they are “creative of 
essential beauty”.9 For this reason, Keats reaches the view that “[t]he excellence of 
every art is its intensity”.10 
For Keats, however, the powers of the imagination are not only artistic but capable 
of engaging with truth. This is not to say that Keats wishes to abolish any philosophical 
sense to the term “truth”. Though he admits to difficulty in seeing how deductive 
reasoning could give rise to truth, he nevertheless appears to concede (hesitatingly) 
this possibility. (“… I have never yet been able to perceive how anything can be known 
for truth by consequitive reasoning – and yet it must be.”11 (Emphasis mine.)) Indeed, he 
concludes his letter with a remarkably even-handed suggestion that Bailey strive for an 
harmonious combination of poetical and philosophical truth, accommodated by a  
 
[…] complex mind, one that is imaginative and at the same time 
careful of its fruits, who would exist partly on sensation, partly on 
thought – to whom it is necessary that years should bring the 
philosophic mind. Such an one I consider yours and therefore it is 
necessary to your eternal happiness that you not only drink this old 
wine of heaven, which I shall call the redigestion of our most ethereal 
musings on earth, but also increase in knowledge and know all 
things.12 
 
Keats is evidently content to permit a dual conception of truth. On the one hand, there 
is truth apprehensible by the “consequitive” deductive “philosophic mind”,13 and it is 
clear that knowledge of this kind of truth – a philosophically substantive knowledge – 
is not something that Keats necessarily discourages. On the other hand, there is what 
Keats calls  
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[…] the truth of imagination. What the imagination seizes as beauty 
must be truth, whether it existed before or not. For I have the same 
idea of all our passions as of love: they are all in their sublime, 
creative of essential beauty.14 
 
This imaginational truth, then, is constituted in the imagination as beauty. We shall 
shortly have cause to return to the subtleties of the above passage, but I wish to 
highlight at this point the facts that, firstly, for Keats the imagination is a creative 
force, and secondly, the beauty it creates is not contingent or projected, but, in being 
“essential”, is ascribed by Keats a certain ideality. Furthermore, imaginational truth, in 
contradistinction to its philosophical counterpart, is portrayed as “ethereal” and 
associated with “heaven”.15 Keats, indeed, is convinced of the “holiness”16, no less, of 
the “heart’s affections”, the “passions” or intense emotions of which the imagination is 
counted as one. 
 Keats goes on to suggest that the apprehension of imaginational truth as truth is 
conditioned, firstly, by the apprehension of beauty by the imagination, and secondly, 
by an emergence or awakening of the subject from the imaginational mode of 
consciousness, for “[t]he imagination may be compared to Adam’s dream: he awoke 
and found it truth”.17 Knowledge of imaginational truth as truth thus becomes 
conceived as the (dispassionate) correlate of the (passionate) apprehension of beauty. 
In the sense that sleeping as such involves the immanent possibility of awakening, the 
disclosure of imaginational truth for Keats is necessarily latent within the 
apprehension of beauty. 
 Philosophically speaking, the fact that Keats sets up a dichotomy between 
“philosophic” propositional truth and imaginational artistic truth itself seems to 
require some further explanation. Keats, the poet, presumably saw nothing 
unsatisfactory in elaborating upon the polysemous nature of the word “truth”. Yet the 
following question seems difficult to ignore. What is it about poetical beauty that leads 
Keats to suppose that it has an essential connection with truth? What, to put it another 
way, makes Keatsian truth truth? 
One possible explanation (an hypothesis that I shall shortly reject) is that Keats 
supposes that poetry engages with an unchanging metaphysical realm, and derives its 
truthfulness from such putative fixity. The prima facie evidence to support this idea is 
Keats’s use of precisely the kind of quasi-religious terminology that I have already 
remarked upon. However, this line of explanation is undermined by the fact that Keats 
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equivocates on whether beauty exists before it is apprehended: the imagination seizes 
beauty as truth “whether it existed before or not”.18 Indeed, the imagination is hardly a 
passive observer of pre-given metaphysical entities, but instead “creative of essential 
beauty”.19 
The striking feature of Keats’s account of the apprehension of beauty is the way in 
which he inverts the Platonic priority of essence over actuality. Indeed, this reversal 
provides us with the direction for a more promising explanation for Keats’s claim that 
poetry has a necessary relation to truth, namely that Keats believes poetry’s 
truthfulness to be attributable to a certain relation it has with the real world. More 
precisely, poetry, for Keats, is not truth-bearing because it necessarily tells us 
something about the world, but rather because it can invoke for the reader the content 
of real-world experience. For this reason, it seems to me, the Keatsian account of 
poetry is inextricably bound up with the role of consciousness. Let us examine more 
closely the way in which Keats implies a connection between consciousness and truth. 
It is understandable, but perhaps not entirely unremarkable, that Keats should use 
the word “heart”20 – a metaphor, commonplace enough, for the emotions – to signify 
the locus of those aspects of experience he calls “the passions”21. Perhaps “heart”, in 
implying a separation from the brain, reinforces the idea of Keats’s proposed 
opposition between philosophical and poetical truth. Nonetheless, the drawback of this 
trope, in my opinion, is that it gives the misleading impression that Keats considers the 
passions to be devoid not only of deductive reasoning, but of thought in general. This 
surely is not Keats’s view. The imagination, after all, is itself conceived as one of the 
passions. And, as we have seen, it is the imagination, according to Keats, which 
apprehends certain experiences as beautiful. 
Moreover, the generalised notion of thought as such turns out to be significant in 
relation to Keats’s understanding of the emotions. The absence of thought, in Keats’s 
view, corresponds to an inchoate state of nascent consciousness that he calls the 
“infant or thoughtless chamber”.22 It should not go unremarked that Keats has almost 
nothing to say about this condition, other than to configure it as a transient phase of 
pre-cognitive immaturity. The significance of the “infant chamber” lies simply in the 
fact that it is a primal state from which we find ourselves “imperceptibly impelled by 
the awakening of the thinking principle within us”.23 Thought, or the “thinking 
principle”, is an immanent awakening in which consciousness finds itself in a second 
chamber, apparently full of “pleasant wonders”,24 and with which we are initially 
“intoxicated”.25 However, the paradoxical nature of this chamber of thought is such 
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that it lends acuity to our understanding of “the heart and nature of man”,26 and 
“convinc[es] one’s nerves that the world is full of misery and heartbreak, pain, sickness, 
and oppression”.27 
The allegorical fashion in which Keats portrays the forms of consciousness (in terms 
of chambers in a mansion) serves the purpose of marking out a relatively clear 
trajectory of discrete mental states. From an initial state of cognitive limbo, 
consciousness comes, through thought, to an understanding of the world, and from 
there to a recognition of suffering in others. Furthermore, Keats goes on to suggest that 
the awareness of suffering in the world gives rise to a state of depressed subjectivity, as 
the “chamber of maiden thought becomes gradually darken’d”.28 
Keats’s image of the darkened chamber signifies an obscured condition of partial 
knowledge, for in it “[w]e see not the balance of good and evil. We are in a mist. We are 
now in that state. We feel the ‘burden of the mystery’”.29 However, this darkening of 
consciousness, that Keats considers to be an inevitable result of thought, is not an 
eventuality that Keats proposes to avert through some kind of poetical line of flight. On 
the contrary, it is precisely the exploration of this depressive “chamber”, and the “dark 
passages” onto which it opens, that Keats considers to be an undertaking of profound 
poetical significance. For this reason, the Wordsworthian quality that Keats picks out 
for praise is that his “genius is explorative of those dark passages”.30 And Keats 
attributes the epistemic power implicit in the idea of such exploration to Wordsworth’s 
cognitive gift for “think[ing] into the human heart”.31 
This idea of the poetic exploration of suffering further illuminates the connection 
Keats makes between poetic beauty and truth. The poetry that Keats calls for is “true” 
in the sense of being grounded in real-world experience; and what could be more real, 
more earthly, than our apprehension of “misery and heartbreak, pain, sickness, and 
oppression”?32 The combination of Keats’s conviction that poetry is truth-bearing with 
his commitment to the poetic importance of real-world experience is strongly 
suggestive that Keats believes the apprehension of poetic beauty to have an important 
recognitional aspect. 
An important paradox now presents itself in Keats’s conception of poetic truth. How 
is Keats’s proposed sense of rootedness in the world to be reconciled with his 
conviction about the “holiness of the heart’s affections”?33 A dialectical emergence of 
the heavenly from the earthly is indeed one of the central motifs of Keats’s thought, 
both theological and literary. From the “mist” of anxiety associated with suffering, in 
which “[w]e see not the balance of good and evil”,34 there emerges (according to Keats’s 
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theological view)35 the (non-spatiotemporal) soul, an identity forged only by the heart. 
This pattern of an immanent permanence within transience – an ideal “beyond” 
accessed precisely through a vicissitudinous actuality – is replicated in Keats’s account 
of poetic beauty and truth. For from the poetical engagement with the experience of 
suffering, according to his meta-poetical position, comes the imaginational 
apprehension of poetic beauty, and a realisation of its truth.  
The Keatsian cognition of beauty centres on a moment of “seizing” which manages 
at once to be both a form of creation (for, as we noted earlier, the imagination is 
“creative of essential beauty”)36 and, I suggest, a special kind of recognition. The idea of 
a recognitional aspect to the apprehension of beauty is of assistance in rendering 
intelligible Keats’s otherwise somewhat puzzling claim that the experience of beauty in 
art is connected in some essential way with truth. But in suggesting that the 
recognitional experience of beauty is also simultaneously creative, Keats seems to be 
implying that such an experience is to be phenomenally differentiated in some 
important way from a more straightforward perception or apperception of something 
ostensibly pre-given or prior to the artistic encounter itself. What seems to be missing 
from Keats’s account is some further and more detailed explication of what it means, 
and why it should be plausible, to think that the “recognitional” and “creative” 
dimensions of aesthetic experience should co-exist in such an intimate way. Although 
Keats does not fully elucidate this matter directly in his letters, he does go some way 
toward attempting to explain poetic effects. He does this, however, neither through 
appealing to textual considerations, nor through addressing cognitive matters relating 
to the reader. Instead, he focuses upon the cognitive skills possessed by the poet. It is 
to this aspect of Keatsian thought that we shall now turn our attention. 
According to Keats, the paradox of beauty we have just considered is made possible 
by the feature of poetic genius that Keats aptly calls negative capability: 
 
Several things dovetailed in my mind, and at once it struck me what 
quality went to form a man of achievement, especially in literature, 
and which Shakespeare possessed so enormously. I mean negative 
capability; that is, when a man is capable of being in uncertainties, 
mysteries, doubts, without any irritable reaching after fact and 
reason.37 
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It is, as Keats’s wording implies, an existential rather than an epistemic talent, for it is 
“being in uncertaint[y]” (emphasis mine). And this being is not distracted or interrupted 
by “any irritable reaching after fact and reason”. The implication of Keats’s description 
is that negative capability is a non-fleeting, sustained dwelling within uncertainty. The 
sense of stability thus implied provides the ground for the elevated certainty of beauty 
that Keats believes great poetry intimates. As Keats suggests, doubt is swept aside 
when “with a great poet the sense of beauty overcomes every other consideration, or 
rather obliterates all consideration”.38 
 In one sense, which illuminates Keats’s understanding of the relation between 
poetry and philosophy, the “uncertainties” Keats has in mind can be understood to 
include the kind of paradoxes and equivocations that philosophy often sets out as a 
matter of course to disentangle. In this respect, Keats conceives of poetry as preceding 
philosophy, and as residing precisely in the questions that straight-talking 
philosophical argument purports to answer, or at least examine rationally. In a 
different, more practical sense, however, the uncertainties that interest Keats also 
include the real-world anxieties inherent in human suffering. Indeed, Keats admires 
Wordsworth, as we have seen, precisely for elucidating such “dark passages” of 
consciousness. Yet Keats’s attitude towards Wordsworth’s poetry is ultimately 
ambivalent. Perhaps Keats’s most central worry is that Wordsworth’s poetry has the 
tendency to draw attention to the narrator’s own mental activity, at the cost of an 
immersion in lived experience. Wordsworth, in Keats’s view, gives the poetic self, its 
imaginative powers and mental prowess, an undue conspicuousness. In a letter of 3rd 
February 1818 to John Hamilton Reynolds, Keats goes so far as to imply that 
Wordsworth’s self-consciousness is ultimately both intrusive and constrictive: 
 
Poetry should be great and unobtrusive, a thing which enters into 
one’s soul, and does not startle it or amaze it with itself but with its 
subject. […] Why should we be owls, when we can be eagles?39 
 
The owl, Keats seems to suggest, holds forth (however wisely) as a self-conscious 
intellect; preferable, by implication, is the eagle soaring instinctively and 
unreflectively. 
 Keats therefore opposes his own conception of poetry not only to philosophical 
enquiry as such, but also to the Wordsworthian predilection for explicit cognitive 
introspection. The Keatsian alternative entails a dissolution of poetic self-identity, an 
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effacement of subjecthood brought about through an inhabitation, so to speak, of the 
objects of contemplation. In a privileging of difference over identity, Keats conceives of 
the poet as exemplifying a protean changeability. Indeed, 
 
[t]he poetical character […] is not itself – it has no self – […] What 
shocks the virtuous philosopher delights the chameleon poet. […] A 
poet is the most unpoetical of any thing in existence, because he has 
no identity, he is continually in for – and filling – some other body.40 
 
Keats thus proposes a displacement of an authoritative poetic voice by an ostensible 
merging of poetic consciousness with its field of contemplation. 
In his book Keats the Poet, S.M. Sperry seems ready to assimilate all of Keats’s 
musing and speculation about the poetical character into an expanded conception of 
Negative Capability,41 even though Keats does not always invoke this term explicitly. In 
this essay I am not primarily concerned with the hermeneutical question as to whether 
Keats conceives of Negative Capability as actually encapsulating the poetical character, 
or instead considers Negative Capability to be a particular aspect of it. It is important, 
however, that we do not blur the distinction between two different claims about the 
capabilities of poetry. On the one hand, there is the claim that the poet has a capacity 
for empathic identification to such a degree that the subject-object dichotomy 
collapses. On the other hand, there is the idea of the poet dwelling in ambiguity and 
paradox, an expressive mode that Keats places in opposition to rational argument. Let 
us examine these two aspects of the poetic character in more detail.       
 The claim that the poet must be capable of empathic identification is, of course, 
hardly controversial. Who would suggest that a poet can do without an imaginative 
understanding of human nature, a sense of what it might be like to be somebody else? 
Yet the striking feature of Keats’s position is the degree of subject-object identification 
that he requires. In Keats’s view, the adequate poetical treatment of others and 
otherness requires a complete effacement of the self. For Keats, furthermore, poetry 
effects an important transformation of subjectivity. The transformation which begins 
in self-negation finds its consummation in the percipient creative discovery of new 
identities to inhabit and animate what was previously locked in alterity. Keatsian poetic 
consciousness not only empathises with its objects, but actually becomes them, and this 
is made possible only through a dissolution of the self.  
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 This is indeed a bold literary claim, and Keats, rather than attempting a theoretical 
explication of how this might be possible, instead sets up Shakespeare as the paradigm, 
an exemplar of Negative Capability whom Keats strives to emulate. Spurning the self-
conscious Wordsworthian cogitations, Keats seeks to emulate instead the 
Shakespearean demonstration of a comprehensive range of human sympathies, and 
perhaps most significantly for Keats, Shakespeare’s sympathy for human suffering. The 
theoretical question remains, however, as to how a transformation of consciousness, of 
the kind Keats describes, could be so complete as to annihilate one’s own identity. In 
this sense, while Keats’s elaboration in his letters of the concept of Negative Capability 
is theoretically suggestive, he ultimately appeals to the concrete historical context of 
English literature rather than explicitly theoretical considerations. 
 Our analysis of the Keatsian understanding of poetic empathy has led us to a 
preliminary sketch of the kind of cognitive acrobatics that Keats implicitly advocates, 
and I have configured this as a kind of transformation of consciousness. The other 
Keatsian claim that we have identified, which pertains to dwelling within “mystery”, 
relates not only to the cognitive requirements that Keats places upon the poet, but also 
to the Keatsian conception of the production of poetic meaning. In many ways, Keats’s 
theoretical understanding of poetic meaning emerges from his postulated opposition 
between poetry and philosophy. An important aspect of this opposition is conveyed in 
his vigorous stipulation that 
 
We hate poetry that has a palpable design upon us – and if we do not 
agree, seems to put its hand in its breeches’ pocket.42 
 
The poet, in other words, must renounce the didactic disposition prevalent in 
philosophical argument. In its place, ambiguity and indeterminacy take root, not as 
undesirable consequences of loose, unrigorous thinking, but as the unpremeditated 
outcome of the empathic transformation of consciousness. Indeed, it is clear from his 
admiration for Shakespeare that Keats takes such indeterminacy, which may 
“crystallise a paradox”,43 as Sperry puts it, or, I might add, give rise in many cases to a 
proliferation of possible meanings, to be a hallmark of the canonical work. Yet Keats 
leaves a further theoretical question unanswered. If a poetical consciousness can dwell 
within existential uncertainty and anxiety, can anything be said in theoretical terms 
about the nature of such an experience, and about its relation to the poetic text? 
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 In this essay I have sought to assess the extent to which a theoretical understanding 
of poetry may be extracted from Keats’s meta-poetical thought. Keats turns out to take 
a deeply cognitive approach by providing a detailed account of both the nature of 
poetic experience and the special creative talents peculiar to the poet of true genius. 
His description of the latter goes some way to explaining certain aspects of the former. 
However, in emphasising the particular abilities of the poet, Keats tends to remain 
causally upstream of a theoretical explication of how the literary text itself produces its 
effects. 
 Keats’s discussion of the poet’s capacity for empathic identification helps to explain 
why he believes poetry has an essential connection with truth, by implying that poetry 
in some sense collapses the subject-object dichotomy. The implicit notion of subject-
object identity renders Keats’s account deeply philosophically suggestive, but 
unfortunately this important poetical matter does not receive, at Keats’s hands, the 
kind of theoretical elaboration I suspect it deserves. In this respect, Keats is more 
inclined to tell us what poetry can achieve than specify precisely how, either in purely 
textual terms, or in terms of the reader’s cognition of the text. 
 Keats’s idea of the poet dwelling within uncertainty, and his attempted syncretism of 
truth and indeterminacy, cohere with his view that poetical thought is alien to 
philosophical reasoning, and that poetry has the capacity to realise complex emotion 
by evoking real-world pre-reflective experience. However, in the absence of any 
cognitive elaboration, it remains ultimately mysterious as to what Keats thinks it might 
mean, existentially, to “be” in such uncertainty, and how such “being” might be 
invoked by the poetic text. While not rejecting the notion of propositional truth, Keats 
believes that poetry has an essential relation to a different, non-propositional form of 
truth. One of the aims of this essay has been to explore the degree of justification, 
implicit or explicit, that Keats provides for this view. I have discounted the possibility 
that Keats believes poetry to engage with an unchanging metaphysical realm on the 
grounds that he equivocates on whether poetic beauty exists before it is apprehended. 
Keats is committed to the ideality of both poetic beauty and truth, but remains 
metaphysically neutral. I have argued that a more likely explanation, though not 
explicitly articulated by Keats, is to be found in the importance he attaches to real-
world experience, and that the truthfulness of Keatsian truth consists in the poetic role 
of experiential recognition. The resulting double aspect to poetic truth, its Janus-like 
relation with ideality and actuality, is a paradox that Keats certainly registers but does 
not fully explain.  
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 While Keats’s notion of Negative Capability is certainly primarily concerned with 
explicating the abilities required of the true poet, it would be mistaken to think that 
Keats attaches little theoretical significance to the role of the reader. On the contrary, 
it is clear from his account of aesthetic value, and the nature of the apprehension of 
beauty and its relation to truth, that the reader of poetry is not conceived as a passive 
and humble admirer of the poet’s craft, but instead turns out to be inseparable from the 
Keatsian understanding of poetry itself. The reader, and more precisely, the role of 
consciousness, are implicated in the very constitution of beauty. 
 Considerations of poetry’s oppositional relation to rationality contribute to Keats’s 
suggestion that poetic beauty can emerge in a context of indeterminacy of meaning. In 
a very particular sense, a sense easily misconstrued, this position liberates the reader 
from a felt obligation to somehow master a text’s meaning, an obligation which 
amounts in itself to a dialectical domination of the reader by the text. Accordingly, the 
reading act itself can come to be conditioned by an a priori acceptance of the possibility 
of multiple readings. It may seem tempting, if slightly overwrought, to characterise this 
as some kind of transcendental emancipation of the reader. The necessary possibility of 
different readings certainly seems to emerge naturally from Keats’s thought. 
Nonetheless, we must not forget that Keats also places formidable demands upon the 
reader. As I have argued, Keats implies that readers apprehend poetic beauty only by 
accessing aspects of their own real-world experience in a recognitional encounter with 
the text; by exploring the depressive “dark passages” of consciousness; by being in 
uncertainty, suffering, anxiety. The Keatsian vocation for the reader is to live the 
emotion of the text, and to recognise certain of its aspects as one’s own. It is, in this 
sense, a call to empathy.44 
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